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Introduction
Human beings invented the concept of risk to help understand and
cope with the dangers and uncertainties of life. Although dangers can
be real, there is no such thing as "real" or "objective" risk. Risk is a
judgment of possible exposure to danger under a set of conditions that
may assumed or may be specified to various levels of detail.1
Constructing and implementing public policies to manage
technological risks in an open, democratic society is an invitation to
controversy this is especially when the subject area has a history of
James Flynn presented an earlier version of this paper at the Colloquium on
Science, Scientific Culture and Public Participation sponsored by the Instituto
Superior de Ci~ncia do Trabalho e da Empresa (ISCTE) at the University of Lisbon
and the Federaqdo Portuguesa das Associaqbes e Sociedades Cientfficas (FEPASC).
The Colloquium was held at the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, Lisbon, on
November 20 and 21, 1997. We would like to express our appreciation to the
organizers of the Colloquium for their support, especially to Professor Maria Eduarda
Gonalves, to our colleagues at Decision Research for their contributions to the ideas
and work incorporated in this paper, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful
comments and suggestions. Preparation of this paper was supported in part by the
National Science Foundation under grant SBR-96-31635.James Flynn is a senior research associate at Decision Research in Eugene,
Oregon. He holds a BA. (English) from Eastern Washington State University and a
M.A. and Ph.D. (English) from the University of Washington. Email:
jflynn @decisionresearch. org.
Paul Slovic is president of Decision Research and Professor of Psychology,
University of Oregon. He received his B.A. (Psychology) from Stanford University
and his MA. and Ph.D. (Psychology) from the University of Michigan.
1 A more formal definition of risk has been drafted by the Committee on Risk
Characterization of the National Research Council:
"Risk": a concept used to give meaning to things, forces, or
circumstances that pose danger to people or to what they value.
Descriptions of risk are typically stated in terms of the likelihood of
harm or loss from a hazard and usually include: an identification of what
is "at risk" and may be harmed or lost (e.g., health of human beings or
an ecosystem, personal property, quality of life, ability to carry on an
economic activity); the hazard that may occasion this loss; and a
judgment about the likelihood that harm will come.
See also Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society (Paul C.
Stern & Harvey V. Fineberg, eds. 1996).
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adversarial struggle, as is the case for public regulation of chemicals,
nuclear technologies, and multiple-use environmental resources. Many
voices seek to represent the "public", often by characterizing public
attitudes and at other times by claiming to represent public interests. In
controversial cases, decision makers are faced with the need to provide
risk management, incorporate the various interests of active
stakeholders, and attain a working level of public acceptance. How are
decision makers to judge the many voices, each seeking to maximize its
perspective, and then respond to public interests and acceptance, which
may be poorly defined? What can be done to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of existing social and political processes?
One approach has been to develop the areas of risk assessment and
risk analysis as primary determinants in structuring public policies and
programs. This approach has proven to be extremely difficult, even
more so than was indicated two decades ago when the Rasmussen
report for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission/Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, the prototype for quantitative risk assessment, was
completed and released. 2 That and subsequent efforts, have been
subjected to relentless scrutiny and criticism. At the same time, this
approach has also gained strong advocates. Despite years of failure to
implement workable solutions for vast areas of technological risk
management and considerable evidence of waning public regard for
government and industry leadership, there are still believers in this
approach in Congress and among elite policy advisors. 3
Complex Issues
Risk assessment and risk analysis ideally should provide careful,
complete, and unbiased information to help policy makers understand
the essential problems that a careful decision process will solve. A
necessary component of this process is an ability to quantify the proper
facts and account for residual uncertainty, by definition a difficult
requirement. The nuclear engineer's probabilistic risk assessment or the
2 See Reactor Safety Study- An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial
Nuclear Power Plants (1975).
3 See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk
Regulation (1993); The Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S.343, 104th
Cong. (Dole/Johnson discussion draft of June 1995).
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toxicologist's quantitative estimate of a chemical's carcinogenic risk are
both based on theoretical models, whose structures are assumption-
laden and whose inputs depend on judgments to account for
uncertainties in theory, data, or coincidence. Careful examination
shows subjectivity at every stage of risk assessment, from initial problem
structuring to deciding which endpoints or consequences to analyze,
identifying and estimating exposures, choosing dose-response
relationships, and so on. The combination of subjective judgment and
rational fact-finding, while often downplayed or denied by strong
advocates of formal risk assessment, is not a limitation to risk
characterization and may be essential for good decisions. 4 Simply
recognizing that both subjective judgment and data are commingled
may also help understand public responses to technological risks.
The remainder of this paper examines a number of studies with a
focus on the differences and similarities between experts in risk analysis
and laypeople respondents. It is our purpose to suggest some of the key
implications of these comparisons for the field of risk communication
and for the development of risk-management policies. One suggestion
is that there are many possible bridges between differences about how
to characterize risks and what should be done about them and not all
bridges need to be, nor should be, constructed with quantified data.
In the case of risk assessment, the language of experts is heavily
weighted toward quantification, which highlights probability and
consequences as the measures of risk. The limitations to quantifying a
wide range of variables essential to understanding risk characterizations
produces, at best, partial explanatory power and substantial uncertainty.
Efforts to use quantified risk information to inform the public and gain
support for controversial policies or programs have often floundered in
the face of public opposition, despite elaborate attempts at risk
communication and public involvement. 5
4 See Antonio Damasio & Hanna Damasio, Making Images and Creating
Subjectivity, The Mind-Brain Continuum (Rodolfo Llinas & Patricia Churchland
eds.,1996); see also Antonio Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the
Human Brain (1994).
5 Baruch Fischhoff, Risk: A Guide to Controversy, Improving Risk
Communication, at Appendix C (1989); Baruch Fischhoff, Risk Perception and
Communication Unplugged: Twenty Years of Process, 15 RiskAnal. 137 (1995).
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Non-scientists have their own models, assumptions, and subjective
techniques (intuitive risk assessments), reflecting a broad and complex
conception of risk that is not often as dependent upon quantification
and classification as that of the experts. Lay conceptions of risk
incorporate qualitative considerations of dread, catastrophic potential,
controllability, equity, uncertainty, risk to future generations, trust and
confidence in management, as well as descriptive "facts", into the risk
equation. 6 Although value-laden, these qualitative considerations
reflect legitimate issues of great social and political import and they
need to be considered in risk-policy decisions. The implications of
addressing such considerations are far-reaching, as noted in a recent
report from the National Research Council. 7 For example, is risk
from cancer (a dreaded disease) worse than risk from auto accidents
(not dreaded)? Is a risk imposed on a child more serious than a known
risk accepted voluntarily by an adult? Is the risk from a polluted
Superfund site worse if the site is located in a neighborhood that has
other hazardous facilities nearby? What role should the values of
environmental justice play in risk management? Difficult questions
multiply when outcomes other than the quantification (probabilities
plus consequences) of mortality and morbidity are considered.
The multidimensional, subjective, value-laden nature of risk
decisions should become clearer with examinations of judgments
provided by experts and laypeople. The next section of this paper looks
at a number of studies that together provide data on risk evaluations
within expert groups, between groups of laypeople, and between the
experts and the public. These data serve as the basis for describing some
important differences between the public and the experts as well as
defining some commonalities that may serve to enhance
communication and understanding. 8
6 Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Science 280 (1987); Paul Slovic, Perceived
Risk, Trust, and Democracy, 13 RiskAnal. 675 (1993).
7 Supra note 1.
8 The description of these studies is necessarily brief and narrowly focused but the
details are available in the publications and reports as referenced in the text. A listing
of Decision Research publications and reports, along with instructions for obtaining
copies are available at: <http://www. decisionresearch.org>.
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Expert and Public Views of Chemicals in the Forest
The first study is a 1994 survey conducted in Ontario, Canada for
the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, Forest Research
Institute. 9 The risk-management issues involved Ontario's provincial
forests, a vast natural resource base. The key points of concern were
vegetation management options, especially the use of herbicides and
other chemicals to manage the forest environment.
The total study involved more than 2,500 survey respondents. The
data are from two populations: a random sample of Ontario households
(N = 1500) and a survey of forestry professionals (N = 201), which
included industry (N = 59) and government (N = 124) foresters and
government biologists (N = 18). All respondents completed the same
telephone survey. 10
Respondents were asked to evaluate the degree of human health risk
presented by 22 activities, technologies, and conditions. The scale for
these ratings was: 1 = Almost no health risk; 2 = Slight risk; 3 =
Moderate risk; and 4 = High risk. The summary results of this task are
shown in Figure 1, which presents the mean ratings for the public and
the professional samples. Notice that only two items were rated the
same for the professionals and the public: cigarette smoking and motor
vehicle accidents. The forest professionals rated all other items as less
risky than did the public.
Further analysis divided the forest professionals into three
subgroups based upon their affiliation with the government or the
timber industry if they were foresters and their professional discipline if
they were biologists.
9 Decision Research, Vegetation Management in Ontario's Forests: Survey
Research of Public and Professional Perspectives (1995) (available from Ministry of
Natural Resources, Ontario Forest Research Institute, P.O. Box 969, 1235 Queen
Street East, Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, P6A 5N5, Canada).
10 A sample also was drawn from timber-dependent communities, based upon
Canada Census data on community employment and business categories, which
resulted in 801 completed interviews. These respondents were similar to the Ontario
public sample in most ways and were not included in this paper in order to simplify
the presentation.
10 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 333 [Fall 1999]
Figure 111
Risk Perceptions in Ontario : Comparison of Public Sample to Forest Professionals
Cigarette smoking
Depletion of ozone layer
Ground water contamination/landfills
Suntanning em
Loss of forest environment
Motor vehicle accidents
Manufacture of chemicals
Agricultural use of herbicides
Dioxin from pulp and paper mills
Water quality
Using herbicides in forests 0
Exposure to asbestos in bldgs. 0
Food additives 0
Climate change 0
Bacteria in food 0
Nuclear power plants 0
Genetically engr. bacteria in agri. 0 ,
Blood transfusions 0 u
Food irradiation 0
Storms and floods 0
Radon in home ,
Medical X-rays 0 U
0% 50% 100%
Percent moderate and high risk responses
0 Forest professionals m Public
The risk ratings in Figures 1 and 2 show that the biologists
perceived the risks to be lower than the public for thirteen of the 22
items. Government and Industry foresters perceived lower risks for 20
of the 22 items. Industry foresters perceived risks as lowest, followed by
government foresters and then biologists.
11 Source, supra note 9.
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Figure 212
Risk Perceptions in Ontario: Comparison of Forest Professionals and Public
Cigarette smoking
Depletion of ozone layer
Ground water contamination/landfills
Suntanning
Loss of forest environment
Motor vehicle accidents
Manufacture of chemicals
Agricultural use of herbicides
Dioxin from pulp and paper mills
Water quality
Using herbicides in forests





































Percent moderate and high risk responses
* Biologists A Government foresters m Public + Industry foresters
100%
The greatest differences in perception of risk between professional
groups and the public were related to forestry issues (Figure 3). Risks
associated with using herbicides and loss of the forest environment were
perceived to be substantially lower by forestry professionals. The public
viewed the loss of forest environment to be a high risk, even more risky
12 Adapted from supra note 9.
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than motor vehicle accidents. Risks associated with herbicide use were
perceived as moderate, but rated similar to asbestos in buildings and
slightly greater than nuclear power plants. 13
Figure 314
Environmental Risk Perceptions: Forest Professionals and Public
Ground water contamination/landfills + A:
Loss of forest environment + A *
Manufacture of chemicals + A*
Agricultural use of herbicides + A . ,*
Dioxin from pulp and paper mills A.,k
Water quality + A ..
Using herbicides in forests + A : :
Genetically engr. bacteria in agri. + k,
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Percent moderate and high risk responses
+ Industry foresters A Government foresters * Biologists * Public
The survey presented a series of statements on five topics that were
rated by respondents using a four point Likert scale with an Agree-
Disagree format. The topics were: 1) environmental values; 2)
agreement with forest management goals; 3) perceptions of risk; 4)
trust in science and management; and 5) acceptability of specific
forestry practices. Responses to these statements allow us to examine
factors that might influence risk evaluations.
Figure 4 indicates that foresters were less likely than the public to
agree with statements about environmental values. The biologists, on
the other hand, were closer to the public on three of the items and were
more likely to state a willingness to trade some of their current
standard of living to protect nature. They were more concerned than
the public about the spiritual values of the natural world and expressed
more concern with the current rate of environmental change.
13 Canada has 21 nuclear power plants, 19 located in Ontario, one in Quebec, and
one in New Brunswick.
14 Adapted from supra note 9.
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Figure 415
Difference in Agreement Between the Public and Forestry Professionals to Questions
About Environmental Values
There are serious environmental problems • . .
where I live (-0.03)
Technological developement is destroying A * .
nature (0.13)
I would be willing to sacrifice much of my i A *
current standard of living to help ensure
that nature is not harmed (0.24)
I am attracted to the spiritual qualities A . .
inherent in the natural world (0.27)
It bothers me that the world's natural A
environment is changing so quickly (0.50)
All species, including humans, have an Am w
equal right to co-exist on the planet (0.56)
-1.00 -0.50 0 +0.50 +1.00
Mean difference in agreement
m Government biologists 0 Government foresters A Industry foresters
An active role of technical management for Ontario forests was
more strongly endorsed by the professionals, ranging from need to
protect planted trees and control unwanted vegetation, to the use of
pesticides to do achieve these goals (Figure 5). The public put more
emphasis on recreation and had a greater confidence in the ability of
nature to regenerate itself.
Foresters were more likely to think that it is okay to impose a small
risk on people without their consent when compared to the public and
the biologists (Figure 6). All three professional groups expressed a
perception of more control over risks than the public did. In the area of
trust and confidence (Figure 7), the professionals generally expressed
more trust in the government and in science than did the public.
15 The mean scores for each group were recalculated to a scale of -1 to +1. The
public mean score on each statement is shown in parentheses. The mean difference is
the mean of each professional group minus the public mean response. The mean public
response for each item is transformed to 0 to show the differences in the figure.
Ada pted from Robert G. Wagner et al., Acceptable Practices in Ontario's Forests:
Differences Between the Public and Forestry Professionals, New Forests (in press).
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Figure 516
Difference in Agreement between the Public and Forestry Professionals to
Questions about Forestry Goals and Approaches
Pesticides are needed for forest management o
(-0.16)*
The primary goal of forest management in * e A
Ontario should be to produce wood products
(-0.13)
Some plants in the forest are harmful and *A
should be controlled (-0.03)
The first priority for forest managers A * 
should be to provide local communities with
jobs in the wood product industry (-0.01)
Forest should be managed primarily as places AM
for human recreation, such as hiking, canoeing, I
camping or fishing (0.03)
Substainable forestry in Ontario will require a A
major reduction in timber harvest
levels (0.22)
The use of hebicides prevents the forest from A .
generating its own solution to unwanted
vegetation (0.26)
Control growth of unwanted vegetation •e A
to improve survival of planted trees (0.37)
Forests grow back better after harvesting if 0 A
new tree sare replanted rather than relaying
on natural regeneration (0.40)
The most important objective of forest A
management should be to protect the
environment (0.54)
-1.00 -0.50 0 +0.50 +1.00
Mean difference in agreement
x Government biologists 0 Government foresters A Industry foresters
16 The mean scores for each group were recalculated to a scale of -1 to +1. The
public mean score on each statement is shown in parentheses. The mean difference is
the mean of each professional group minus the public mean response. The mean public
response for each item is transformed to 0 to show the differences in the figure.
Adapted from Wagner et al., supra note 15.
Flynn & Slovic: Evaluations of Technological Risk 343
Figure 617
Difference in Agreement Between the Public and Forestry Professionals to
Questions about Controlling Health Risks
When the health risk is very small, it
is okay for society to impose that risk I
on individuals without their consent
(-0.51)
People in Ontario are becoming too
concerned about small health risks
(-0.05)
I feel that I have very little control A..
over risks to my health (0.03)
Herbicides pose a greater risk to the A * .
natural environment than they do to
individual human health (0.06)
I believe that a risk-free environment
is an attainable goal in Ontario
(0.12)
-1.00 -0.50 0 +0.50 +1.00
Mean difference in agreement
n Government biologists * Government foresters A Industry foresters
A point of special interest is the spread of ratings among the
forestry professionals. These are people with considerable scientific
training, working interactively in the same geographic area under a
common set of legal, institutional, and administrative rules. On several
levels communications are ongoing, especially between government and
industry foresters who share management responsibilities under long
term contracts. Despite all the forces that would encourage similar
responses to the survey questions, there are clear differences based upon
employment affiliation.
A difference between the biologists and the foresters is even more
noticeable. These differences suggest that subjective characteristics as
well as scientific training and orientation are involved in professional
judgments about forest vegetation management. They also indicate
17 The mean scores for each group were recalculated to a scale of -1 to +1. The
public mean score for each statement is shown in parentheses. The mean difference is
the mean of each professional group minus the public mean response. The mean public
response for each item is transformed to 0 to show the differences in the figure.
Adapted from Wagner et al., supra note 15.
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potential sources of misunderstanding between forest management
professions and the public on official policies and practices.
Figure 718
Difference in Agreement Between the Public and Forestry Professionals to
Questions about Trust in Science and Government
I trust our government to make the proper *3
decisions about the management of
environmental risks (-0.24)
Federal and provincial government agencies do si
a good job in regulating the use of herbicides
and insecticides (-0.09)
Scientists are able to make accurate estimates A
of the risks from herbicides (0.12)
Current scientific inforamation should decide . A E
the outcome of environmental disputes (0.20)
Environmental health risk decisions should * A.
be made by scientific experts (0.23)
The forest industy will protect the A * *
environment only if it is required to by the
government (0.25)
Differences of opinion about the risks of 0 An
chemicals should be settled by scientific data
and analysis (0.36)
-1.00 -0.50 0 +0.50 +1.00
Mean difference in agreement
n Government biologists * Government foresters A Industry foresters
18 The mean scores for each group were recalculated to a scale of -1 to 1. The
public mean score on each statement is shown in parentheses. The mean difference is
the mean of each professional group minus the public mean response. The mean public
response for each item is transformed to 0 to show the differences in the figure.
Adapted from Wagner et al., supra note 15.
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Figure 819
Difference in Agreement between the Public and Forestry Professionals to Questions




Harvest timber in provincial parks (-0.27)
Herbicides from tractors (-0.23)
Genetically engineered organisms (-0.13)








Heavy equipment for soil prep. (0.26)
Natural plant toxins (0.31)
Replant logging roads (0.31)
Control growth near young trees (0.37)
Cover crops (0.38)
Grazing (0.43)
Manually clear brush (0.48)







-1.00 -0.50 0 +0.50 +1.00
Mean difference in agreement
m Government biologists * Government foresters A Industry foresters
Past studies support the argument that analogous conditions exist in
other professional fields. For example, one2 0 compared public survey
results with a convenience sample from an American Nuclear Society
(ANS) group in regard to the risks of a high-level radioactive waste
program. The ANS respondents and the public recorded distinctly
different areas of concern, with the public focusing on health and
environmental risks and the ANS experts on procedural, political, and
economic problems. Others interviewed members of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in 1990 and found
differences in risk perception between physical scientists and life
scientists with the former providing lower risk ratings, and between
19 Id.
20 James Flynn, et al., The Nevada Initiative: A Risk Communication Fiasco, 13
RiskAnal. 497 (1993).
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men and women with men producing lower risk ratings.2 1 They
concluded that explaining risk perception differences between men and
women as a 'product of "ignorance or irrationality is implausible" and
they suggest social and biological differences as more "fruitful" areas in
which to look for an explanation 22 . Another set of studies, to which we
now turn, provides considerable insight into the nature of differential
risk perceptions with survey data from toxicologists in several countries.
From the Lab: Experts and the Public View of Animal Studies
Toxicologists are highly trained scientists who study chemicals,
their uses, risks, and controls. Survey studies carried out with
toxicologists over the past decade provide insight into the evaluations
these professionals make of chemical dangers. The data for this
discussion of the public and toxicologists come from surveys of the
U.S. Society of Toxicology (N =180),23 the Canadian Society of
Toxicology (N =150),24 the British Toxicological Society (N
=312), 2 5 and senior managers at a major U.K chemical company.2 6
For this paper, we focus on two questions dealing with animal studies
and chemicals. The survey instruments asked for responses on a four-
point Likert scale, (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree):
• Question A: "The way that an animal reacts to a
chemical is a reliable predictor of how a human would
react to it."
* Question B: "If a scientific study produces evidence that
a chemical causes cancer in animals then we can be
reasonably sure that the chemical will cause cancer in
humans."
Also two surveys asked lay respondents this pair of questions. A
1988 survey of Portland, Oregon residents (N =263),27 which is
21 Richard Barke et al., Risk Perceptions of Men and Women Scientists, 78 Soc.
Sci. Q. 167 (1997).
22 Id.
23 Nancy N. Kraus et al., Intuitive Toxicology: Expert and Lay Judgments of
Chemical Risks, 12 RiskAnal. 215 (1992).
24 Paul Slovic et al., Intuitive Toxicology II: Expert and Lay Judgments of
Chemical Risks in Canada, 15 RiskAnal. 661 (1995).
25 Paul Slovic et al., Evaluating Chemical Risks: Results of a Survey of the British
Toxicology Society, 16 Hum. & Exp. Toxicol. 289 (1997).
26 C. K. Mertzet et al., Judgments of Chemical Risks: Comparisons Among Senior
Managers, Toxicologists, and the Public, 18 RiskAnal. 391 (1998).
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shown with the U.S toxicologist's responses in sections la and lb in
Table 1, and a 1992 Canadian national survey (N = 1506),28 shown
along with the Canadian toxicologist's responses in sections 2a and 2b.
No public data are available for the U.K. but responses from U.K.
toxicologists can be reported and are displayed in section 3b in Table 1.
Table 1 shows that question A obtains more agreement from
toxicologists than from the public but that the specific condition in
question B, that a scientific study produces evidence of cancer in an
animal, increases public agreement that the animal results generalize to
humans (sections la and 2a) but decreases toxicologists' beliefs that the
findings have implications for human health (sections lb, 2b, and 3b).
This decrease is greater for male toxicologists than for female. Also,
U.S. toxicologists in industry were considerably less inclined to agree
that a study producing evidence that a chemical causes cancer in
animals indicates that we can be reasonably sure that the chemical will
cause cancer in humans (Table 1, section 1 b).
The 1992 Canadian public data in Table 1, section 2c, shows that
responses for males and females are basically the same for both
questions. The public evaluates the evidence of cancer in an animal
study as evidence that the chemical would cause cancer in humans.
While the Canadian toxicologists are slightly more likely than the
public respondents to agree with question A (section 2b), they respond
to question B by moving in the opposite direction. Only half of
the toxicologists, as compared to 84% of the public, agree or strongly
agree with question B. As was the case with the U.S. sample of
toxicologists, those with industry affiliation were the least likely to
agree with question B.
The survey results for British toxicologists (Table 1, section 3b)
show the same affiliation pattern as found in the earlier U.S. and
Canadian studies with industrial scientists being the least inclined to
extrapolate carcinogenic findings in animals to humans. In addition, a
27 Slovic, supra note 24.
28 Daniel Krewski et al., Health Risk Perception in Canada I: Rating Hazards,
Sources of Information and Responsibility for Health Protection, 1 Hum. and
Ecological Risk Assess. 117 (1995); Daniel Krewski et al., Health Risk Perception in
Canada II: Worldviews, Attitudes and Opinions, 1 Hum. & Ecological Risk Assess.
231 (1995).
10 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 333 [Fall 1999]
clear distinction is present between the male and female toxicologists.
While males discounted the evidence of cancer in animals as predictive
of results for humans, the women found it credible and increased their
agreement, much like the women respondents to the public surveys in
the U.S. (section la) and Canada (section 2a).
Table 1
Public and Toxicologists' Responses to Two Questions About Animal Testing
Survey Data 1988-1994 (Percent agree and Strongly Agree)
l. U.S.: lb. 1988 U.S. Toxicologists (N=170)
1988 Community Sample (H=262)
QA QB A QA QB A
Men 49% 68% +19% Men 54% 38% -16%
Woman 35 69 +34 Women 64 56 - 8
Total 44 69 +25 Total 55 41 -14
Academic 44 46 + 2
Government 56 51 - 5
Industry 52 22 -30
2a, Canada: 2b. 1993 Toxicologists (N=150)
1992 Public('.=1500)
QA QB A QA QB A
Men 62% 84% +22% Men 69% 52% -17%
Woman 61 84 +23 Women 58 45 -13
Total 62 84 +22 Total 66 51 -15
Academic 69 56 -13
Government 63 54 - 9
Industry 65 35 -30
3a. UK: 3b. 1994 Toxicologists (N=312)
No public data available
QA QB A
Men 54% 31% -23%
Women 35 46 +11
Total 48 35 -13
Academic 37 39 + 2
Government 50 35 -15
Industry 52 30 -22
Results from these surveys allow us to make several observations.
Although animal studies are considered essential in testing for the
potential adverse effects of chemicals on human beings, the percentage
of the public agreeing that animal studies predict human effects is
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modest, as is the percentage of agreement among toxicologists.
However, when evidence of cancer is found in animal studies, the
public's interpretations of the findings are different from those reported
by toxicologists. The public interprets such results as evidence that the
chemical tested will cause cancer in humans while the toxicologists,
particularly those in industry, tend to discount such results.
The reservations expressed by toxicologists about the meaning of
animal studies are based upon their knowledge of the testing
procedures and insight into the limitations of compairing laboratory
animal tests to human health. The public, on the other hand, accepts
the connection between laboratory-based animal tests and potential
dangers for humans who might be exposed to the same chemicals.2 9
Members of the public also exhibit an insensitivity to dose, believing
that chemicals are toxic in small as well as large doses. This, naturally, is
coupled with strong concerns about exposures to toxic or carcinogenic
chemicals no matter how small those exposures are. Laboratory test
results showing a potential cancer link appear to reinforce "intuitive" lay
judgments of "contamination" 3 0 and the idea that even a single
exposure can result in cancer.3 1 Another contribution to these public
evaluations may come from risk communication attempts designed to
improve regard for public health efforts. Some observers believe "risk
assessment has been oversold because of the need to rationalize
decisions about chemicals," 3 2 as policy makers and program
administrators seek to justify their programs. The use of research results
by non-scientists raises the issue of how such technical findings are used
to influence public behaviors and address questions of public health. As
risk messages are filtered through social institutions and organizations
on their way to the public in attempts to substantiate policy and
program decisions, these messages may not represent expert positions
accurately and they may have unintended effects in creating public
perceptions of risks from chemicals.
29 Id.
30 Paul Rozin et al., Operation of the Laws of Sympathetic Magic in Disgust and
Other Domains, 50 J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 703 (1986).
31 Slovic, supra note 24.
32 Id. at 231; William D. Ruckelshaus, Risk, Science, and Democracy, 1 Issues in
Sci. and Technol. 19 (1985) ; John D. Graham et al., In Search of Safety (1988).
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Figure 933






Crime and violence ,.
Street drugs , :
AIDS : *
Breast implants
Drinking alcohol : *
Ozone depletion :
Chemical pollution * :
Malnutrition : *
Molds in food * .
Bacteria in food : .
Prescrition drugs S 3
Nuclear waste : :
Asbestos :
Medical X-rays : *
Contraceptives : .
Indoor air quality :
Nonprescription drugs E.
PCBs and dioxins :
Nuclear power plants :
Climate change
Outdoor air quality ,
Pesticides in food ',
Waste incinerators •
Heart pacemakers * :
Food additives : :
Hi-volt power lines ,
Tap water : ,
Contact lenses 0 *;
Mercury in fillings 
. :
VDTs 0 :
Genetically engr. bacteria 0 :




0 Toxicologist * Public
33 Sources: Paul Slovic et al., Health Risk Perception in Canada (1993) (H46-2/93-170E available from Minister of Supply and Services Canada); Paul Slovic et al.,
Intuitive Toxicology II: Expert and Lay Judgements of Chemical Risks in Canada,
15 RiskAnal. 661 (1995); and Nancy N. Kraus, Torbjorn Malmfors & Paul Slovic,
Intuituve Toxicology: Expert and Lay Judgments of Chemical Risks, 12 Risk Anal.
215 (1992).
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A display of risk ratings for the same items is shown in Figure 9, for
Canadian toxicologists and the Canadian public. With the exception of
motor vehicle accidents and cigarette smoking, the items are rated
more risky by the public. These findings are analogous to results found
with the Ontario public and forestry professionals, above.
As in the case of the forest professionals, there is a clear difference
between toxicologists and the public in evaluating the risks of chemicals
to human health. At the same time, more detailed examination shows a
range of positions for both the professionals and the public with some
overlap. The areas of overlap may contain the basis for a more common
understanding upon which to develop public policies and programs.
Social-Political Factors in Public Perceptions ofRisk
A 1992 survey of the public in the U.S. provides data on the risk
evaluations for a substantial sample (N = 1512) and allows examination
of a number of factors that influence risk judgments. The basic
subsamples analyzed were men and women categorized by race and
ethnicity. The survey contained 155 items, including questions about
attitudes and opinions, values, world views, knowledge, and beliefs
about environmental health risks. 34
One of the most consistent findings in public risk perception studies
over the past two decades has been the higher perceived risks among
women than among men. 35 Figure 10 shows a typical display of the
difference in perceived risk between men and women. The 1992 survey
also showed a similar pattern between white and nonwhite respondents,
as displayed in Figure 11, where nonwhites had higher perceptions of
risks than whites. The hypotheses put forth to explain the gender
differences can be grouped into three categories. The first asserts basic
biological differences: e.g., that women are physically more vulnerable
than men; women give birth and are physically and psychologically
attuned to nurture life so they tend to be averse to life-threatening risks.
A second category cites social differences as the basis for women's
responses. According to this view, women lack familiarity and
34 James Flynn et al., Gender, Race, and Perception of Environmental Health
Risks, 14 RiskAnal. 1101 (1994).
35 The discussion in this section is drawn from id. where, for example, fourteen
citations from the period 1984-1993 referenced that document and discuss gender
differences.
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knowledge of science and technology and distrust male-dominated
technologies. A third category claims there is a combination of biology
and social experience that creates a "different voice" that is distinct to
women.3 6 These explanations focus on what is different about women.
They could just as appropriately center around the difference in men.
Figure 1037









Hi-volt power lines 15.8
Street drugs 55.6
Motor vehicle accidents 32.9
Blood transfusions 25.1
Chemical pollution 41.6
Pesticides in food 32.0
Bacteria in food 18.7
Cigarette smoking 57.9
Storms and floods 11.5
Radon in home 12.2
Climate change 22.9
Food irradiation 18.0
Outdoor air quality 24.8
Coal/oil burning plants 18.5
Genetically engin. bacteria 15.0
Medical X-rays 5.8
Commercial air travel 7.3
VDTs 9.6
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Percent difference in high risk
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The analysis of the 1992 survey data looked at four groups: White
Males, White Females, Nonwhite Males, and Nonwhite Females, as
shown in Figure 12. These data tend to support some lines of
36 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's
Development (1982); Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology,
and the Scientific Revolution (1980).
37 Base percent equals percent male high-risk response. Percent difference is percent
female high-risk response minus percent male high-risk response. Source: James Flynn,
Paul Slovic & C.K. Mertz, Gender, Race and Perception of Environmental Health
Risks, 14 RiskAnal. 1101 (1994).
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explanation and to reduce confidence in others. Significantly, non-
white males and females are not greatly different in their risk
evaluations, and they are quite similar to white females. If the biological
explanations were valid, a difference between nonwhite males and
females should exist as is present between white males and females.
Figure 11
3 8
Perceived Health Risks to American Public by Race
Differences between Whites and Nonwhites
Base %
Bacteria in food 20.2
Genetically engr. bacteria 14.2
Pesticides in food 34.0
Chemical pollution 44.4
Nuclear waste 57.2
Radon in home 14.2
Nuclear power plants 30.1
Climate change 24.8





Storms and floods 14.0
Commercial air travel 7.5
Cigarette smoking 60.9
VDTs 9.5




Motor vehicle accidents 37.5
Outdoor air quality 27.0
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Stress 54.8 ,
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However, this is not the case. It is the white males that stand apart
here. The data analysis then focused on white males. The goal was to
understand what in the white male population most accounted for the
striking difference in perception of risk. The strategy was to isolate the
most risk-accepting white males and examine these respondents. This
was done by selecting a subgroup of 246 white males at the low-risk
38 Same source as Figure 10. Base percent equals white high-risk response. Percent
difference is nonwhite high-risk response minus white high-risk response.
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end of risk perceptions and comparing them with the other 370 white
males and the 873 white females and nonwhite males and females in
the sample. These 246 respondents were identified by starting with the
lowest-scoring white male and adding white males until the mean score
of the remaining white males matched the mean score for all other
persons (all females and nonwhite males) in the sample.
Figure 1239
Mean Risk-Perception Ratings by Race and Gender
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There are several differences between these low-risk white males and
the other respondents.40 They were better educated (42% college or
postgraduate degrees vs. 26.3% in the other group), had higher
household incomes (32.1% above $50,000 vs. 21.0%), and were
politically more conservative (48.0% identified themselves as
39 Same source as Figure 10.
40 The comparisons listed for the low-risk white males and the other respondents in
this section are statistically significant at p < 0.01.
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conservative vs. 33.2% in the other group). There was no age difference.
Turning to attitudes, the low-risk white males were more likely than
other respondents to:
- agree that future generations can take care of themselves
when facing risks imposed by today's technology (64.2% vs.
46.9%);
* agree that if a risk is very small it is OK for society to
impose it on individuals without their consent (31.7% vs.
20.8%);
* agree that science can settle differences of opinion about
the risks from nuclear power (61.8% vs. 50.4%);
* agree that government and industry can be trusted to
make the proper decisions to mange the risks from
technology (48.0% vs. 31.1%);
* agree that experts and engineers who build, operate, and
regulate nuclear power plants can be trusted (62.6% vs.
39.7%);
L agree that pushing equal rights in the U.S. has gone too
far (42.7% vs. 30.9%);
* agree with the use of capital punishment (88.2% vs.
70.5%);
* disagree that technological development is destroying
nature (56.9% vs. 32.8%);
* disagree that they have very little control over risk to
their health (73.6% vs. 63.1%);
* disagree that the world needs a more equal distribution
of wealth (42.7% vs. 31.3%);
* disagree that local residents should have the authority to
close a nuclear power plant if they think it is not being run
properly (50.4% vs. 25.1%); and
: disagree that the public should vote to decide on issues
such as nuclear power (28.5% vs. 16.7%)
Overall, the low-risk white males can be characterized by trust in
institutions and authorities and they are not inclined to give decision-
making power to local citizens in areas of risk management. The data
from this study move us toward sociopolitical explanations of the
differences between low-risk white males and other citizens. These
results have implications for risk communication, public involvement in
risk decisions, and the social, ethical, and moral values that need to be
considered in programs and policies to control risks to society.
Risk Analysis and Decision Analysis
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In looking to the difference between experts and the public, we can
see a shadow of the low-risk white males in a number of important
scientific and technical professions. Given the educational, economical,
and social stratification of society it is inevitable that elite members will
exercise considerable influence in science, politics, policy making, and
the management of technology. They will not always reflect the
broader public values, nor will their perspective on what constitutes a
trustworthy or efficient management process be the same as the
perspective of the larger public. Nonetheless, experts in several
professions, as we have seen above, have a range of opinions about risks
and about decisions. This is analogous to the wide range of attitudes
typically recorded in public opinion surveys although members of the
public hold more diverse views. This difference may be due partly to
the professional focus on risk issues that results as a natural outgrowth
of career work, with perhaps contributing influence by socio-cultural
conditions that are characterized by education, income, value
formation, and social class. )What remains to be considered is whether,
in the midst of disparate and often adversarial positions about the
management of technological hazards, there exists some basis for
common ground between experts and the public. It appears to us that
the potential common ground would have to be acknowledged and
incorporated more clearly in the decision process. This would require
moving beyond the idea that risk assessment and risk analysis should be
the dominant determinants of policy or program decisions.41
Movement in this direction will require a new self-consciousness on the
part of experts and an enhanced awareness of the public's perspective,
including the reasons, values, and concerns that lay persons bring to the
decision-making process.
In the U.S. and elsewhere, technical and administrative experts tend
to share a strong belief in rationalizing risk management and reducing
the role of qualitative values. They tend to agree with Justice Stephen
Breyer who characterized the current condition as a "vicious circle" of
uniformed public perceptions, political over reaction, and stringent
41 Paul Slovic & Robin Gregory, Risk Analysis, Decision Analysis, and the Social
Context for Risk Decision Making, Decision Science and Technology: Reflections
on the Contributions of Ward Edwards (James Shanteau, B. Mellers & D. Schum
eds., in press).
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regulation that produces obsessive and costly strategies to address
negligible risks. Breyer's solution was to provide authority to experts
and thereby reduce the difficulties originating with public controversies.
This perspective found advocates in the U.S. Congress where legislation
was introduced (but not passed) to require higher levels of reliance on
expert risk assessment for public decision making.42
There is no doubt that good technical analysis is vital for informing
risk decisions, making them more consistent and more accountable.
However, value conflicts and pervasive distrust of risk management,
sources of much public controversy, cannot be easily reduced by
technical analysis. Addressing risk controversies with new levels of
scientific facts and risk assessment is likely to exacerbate conflict rather
than reduce it.
Scientific literacy and public education are important, but the
problems these efforts address are seldom central to risk controversies.
The public is not irrational. The public is influenced by emotion and
values in ways both simple and sophisticated. So are scientists. The
public is influenced by world views, ideologies, values, and their social
contexts. So are scientists, especially when they are working at the limits
of their expertise. 43
The limitations of risk science, the importance and difficulty of
maintaining trust, and the subjective and contextual influences on risk
judgments all point to the importance of an inclusive decision process
for making societal risk decisions. This direction would initiate basic
changes in risk communication and decision making by expanding the
public's direct role in defining policies. Public involvement can improve
the relevance and quality of technical analyses, but equally important, it
can expand the vision of the decision process and contribute to the
legitimacy and public acceptance of the final outcomes.
42 Breyer, supra note 3; U.S. Senate, supra note 3.
43 These points are developed more fully in Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex,
Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk-Assessment Battlefield, Environment, Ethics,
and Behavior, 277-313 (Max H. Bazerman et al. eds. 1997); See also Fischoff, supra
note 5; Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Scientific Method, Anti-Foundationalism and
Public Decision Making, 1 Risk 23 (1990).
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Conclusion
Public involvement is no short-term panacea for the problems of
risk management. But serious attention to participation and the process
issues may, in the long run, narrow the gap between expert and public
positions on risk-management decisions. The clear message from risk
perception research is that the time has come to move away from
paternalistic decision making because it does not and cannot represent
the full range of concerns that need to be included in technological risk
decisions. The work of experts, both quantitative and qualitative, must
be seen as contributions to making policy decisions rather than the final
determinants of decisions. Risk analysis should contribute to decisions
and not replace them. The most likely direction to achieve public
acceptance of societal-level decisions is through better public
representation, an objective that is intrinsic to the developing values of
democracy in the world.
